Desde mediados del siglo XX ha aumentado progresivamente la incidencia y prevalencia de la depresión y se ha llegado a considerar que existe una epidemia de depresión. Los autores que han analizado esta idea consideran que la evidencia no avala tales extremos, pero señalan diferentes factores explicativos propios del desarrollo histórico de la psiquiatría, de su situación interna y de su relación con la sociedad. Tales explicaciones guardan similitud con las características propias de un proceso de disease mongering que se (...) define por ampliar las fronteras de la enfermedad para expandir los mercados. Mostraré como una revisión del desarrollo histórico de la psiquiatría, en relación con estas posibles hipótesis explicativas, permite afirmar que ciertas actitudes o situaciones han podido fomentar un proceso de disease mongering asociado a intereses privados y valores de los agentes relevantes en el desarrollo de la psiquiatría en cuestiones como: creación de un método diagnóstico, innovación farmacológica y regulación de nuevos fármacos. Sin embargo, debido a limitaciones conceptuales o epistémicas, no se puede realizar una afirmación más fuerte. (shrink)

Existe una guerra cultural que pretende la destrucción de Occidente utilizando como caballo de Troya el enemigo interno del “virus cultural posmoderno”. Se analiza el origen complejo de dicho virus, con más de una cepa, sin descartar la posibilidad de que fuera diseñado en un laboratorio. Apelando a acabar con las verdades fuertes, el “pensamiento culturalmente correcto”impone su propia verdad fuerte sin buscar acuerdo ni síntesis con quien piensa diferente. Se examinan sus principales variantes que se caracterizan por la (...) ausencia de límites y un exceso de contradicciones que producen el aumento de la polaridad, la confusión y la fragilidad. Para contrarrestar todo ello, el artículo plantea algunas posibles vacunas en torno a la idea de un renacimiento cultural y un nuevo equilibrio entre modernidad y tradición. (shrink)

Collective book dedicated to the philosophical thought of Francisco Suárez.

Insofar as the so-called new theory of reference has come to be acknowleged as the leading theoretical paradigm in semantic research, it has been widely accepted that proper names directly refer to their designation. In advancing some of the most convincing arguments in favour of this view of names, S. Kripke has however left somehow undecided what the role of context is in determining which is the direct referent for a name. According to one interpretation of his thought, context has (...) only an external task in allowing one to simultaneously select a name and a given referent for it. Although this interpretation is the most faithful to Kripke's own intentions, there is another possible interpretation of what he says, according to which context more significantly permits one to determine a given referent at a time for one and the same name1. This different interpretation of the role of context is not marginal for the purpose of semantics, since it generates two distinct theoretical conceptions of what a proper name is. According to the former, the 'idiosyncratic' conception, proper names are individuated (at least) by their form and bearer. According to the latter, the 'linguistic' conception, they are individuated by their morphology only: i.e., by their being (syntactically) unstructured strings of letters. The two conceptions prove to be substantially different when homonyms are called into play. Insofar as both the Greek philosopher and the famous shipowner are called "Aristotle", we have two distinct, albeit homonymous, names for the idiosyncratic conception but only one name (as applied to two distinct individuals) for the linguistic conception2. In what follows, I will first sketch one of the most recent attempts to support for the idiosyncratic view, namely the one which traces back to Kaplan [1990] theory of words, and recall its merits over its cognate idiosyncratic theories. I will then try to give an argument in favour of the linguistic conception, by pointing out how the latter.... (shrink)

En 1976, mientras Milton Friedman recoge el Premio Nobel de Economía por sus logros en los campos del análisis del consumo y la teoría monetaria, el punk expande su mensaje de disonancia empujando los límites de lo decible hacia espacios hasta entonces poco conocidos. En ese mismo momento bandas como Iron Maiden comienzan a generar imaginarios extraños que canalizan algunas tendencias sociales; las pistas de baile exploran nuevas formas de relación cultural, y el espíritu nihilista de Iggy Pop flota en (...) el ambiente. La década de 1970 es la década del extrañamiento, en la que el sueño económico de la posguerra se deshace provocando la aparición en el horizonte de una “nueva” forma de revisar la construcción de la vida cotidiana: el neoliberalismo. En paralelo a este proceso, y en dirección opuesta, existe una búsqueda de respuestas a nivel cultural. Respuestas que no pretenden salvar nada, sino ahondar en la miseria de ese mismo tiempo. Ahí aparecen el punk y otros movimientos que pronto son devorados por el mercado. Pero ¿desde dónde se nos ha contado esta historia de derrotas? ¿Hemos aceptado que la historia de nuestras derrotas culturales sea narrada por la maquinaria neoliberal? Quizá debamos plantarnos y pensar otras formas de narrar una década, la de los setenta, en cuya estela seguimos. Este libro es un intento radical y novedoso de explorar este periodo donde cultura y política se cruzan a través de la música"--Publisher's description. (shrink)

In his highly regarded history of the rise of clinical trials in America, HarryMarks describes how their widespread adoption resulted largely fromthe efforts of ‘therapeutic reformers’ who sought to replace the individualexpertise of clinicians with the ‘science of controlled experiment’. Thetransition described by Marks resembles in many respects the transition fromthe ‘truth-to-nature’ objectivity of individual experts to a ‘mechanical’ formof objectivity portrayed by Daston and Galison. In particular,Marks details the passage from a regime of trust in expertise and experts to (...) aregime based on the mechanical generation of data, the elimination ofhuman judgement and the adoption of a ‘view from nowhere’ where individual and group idiosyncrasies are systematically suppressedthrough recourse to quantitative methods.[...]. (shrink)

August Weismann proposed that genetic changes in somatic cells cannot pass to germ cells and hence to next generations. Nevertheless, evidence is accumulating that some environmental effects can promote heritable changes in the DNA of germ cells, which implies that some somatic influence on germ line is possible. This influence is mostly detrimental and related to the presence of oxidative stress, which induces mutations and epigenetic changes. This effect should be stronger in males due to the particular characteristics of sperm. (...) Here, we propose the hypothesis that females are able to avoid males with oxidatively damaged DNA in the germ line by using oxidative‐dependent (pre‐ and post‐mating) signals. This new hypothesis may shed light on unsolved questions in evolutionary biology, such as the benefits of polyandry, the lek paradox, or the role of sexual selection on the evolution of aging. BioEssays 30:1212–1219, 2008. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

_An eclectic history of human curiosity, a great feast of ideas, and a memoir of a reading life from an internationally celebrated reader and thinker_ Curiosity has been seen through the ages as the impulse that drives our knowledge forward and the temptation that leads us toward dangerous and forbidden waters. The question “Why?” has appeared under a multiplicity of guises and in vastly different contexts throughout the chapters of human history. Why does evil exist? What is beauty? How does (...) language inform us? What defines our identity? What is our responsibility to the world? In Alberto Manguel’s most personal book to date, the author tracks his own life of curiosity through the reading that has mapped his way. Manguel chooses as his guides a selection of writers who sparked his imagination. He dedicates each chapter to a single thinker, scientist, artist, or other figure who demonstrated in a fresh way how to ask “Why?” Leading us through a full gallery of inquisitives, among them Thomas Aquinas, David Hume, Lewis Carroll, Rachel Carson, Socrates, and, most importantly, Dante, Manguel affirms how deeply connected our curiosity is to the readings that most astonish us, and how essential to the soaring of our own imaginations. (shrink)

Leibniz’s treatment of contingency proceeds by degrees and develops in parallel to the systematizations of his thought. In the time about the Confessio Philosophi, he sustains the idea of contingency on the possible as such, in the hypothetical necessity and in the divine creation. In the years previous to the systematization of the Discours de Métaphysique(1680-1686), Leibniz defends the idea of contingency through the following factors: the complete notion of substance, the infinite analysis of the truths and the first decree (...) of the divine will. (shrink)

We investigate the uniform computational content of the open and clopen Ramsey theorems in the Weihrauch lattice. While they are known to be equivalent to $\mathrm {ATR_0}$ from the point of view of reverse mathematics, there is not a canonical way to phrase them as multivalued functions. We identify eight different multivalued functions and study their degree from the point of view of Weihrauch, strong Weihrauch, and arithmetic Weihrauch reducibility. In particular one of our functions turns out to be strictly (...) stronger than any previously studied multivalued functions arising from statements around $\mathrm {ATR}_0$. (shrink)

All over Europe, the provision of healthcare services is widely considered a primary duty of the government. Universal access to medical care can be considered a basic ingredient of the so-called “European social model.” But if universal access to medical care is seldom questioned, European governments—faced with expanding costs caused by an increasing demand driven by an aging population and technology-driven improvements—are contemplating the possibility of “rationing”1 treatments, or the possibility of allowing a greater role for private suppliers. If a (...) “multi-tier” healthcare system has long been anathema to the European leadership, guaranteeing a uniform access to state-of-the-art care seems to be well beyond the means of states suffering from persisting debt crisis. Was the failure of state-controlled “adequate” healthcare totally unpredictable? Far-sighted criticisms had been offered by two eminent thinkers in the classical liberal tradition, Herbert Spencer and Friedrich A. von Hayek . Neither author is usually recognized as a forerunner of contemporary critics of the welfare state, and both investigated the issue of the state financing and providing health services well before or right after the establishment of national health services. With the benefit of hindsight, reading Spencer and Hayek helps us to understand how the crisis of state-supplied healthcare is not rooted in the mere progress of clinical technology, but is rather the logical consequence of the theoretical basis of the model itself. Whereas modern theorists of the welfare state tend to offer theories that are impervious to a critical appraisal of their unintended consequences—insofar as they are framed in a language of “rights”—both Hayek and Spencer understood that human systems are complex, and that unwanted effects of public policy should be taken into account. Although Spencer emphasized the moral hazards accruing from the paternalism involved in governmental provision of health services, Hayek explained how modern healthcare systems differ from real, private insurance designed to offer proper coverage against risks. These authors appreciated that the politicization of healthcare was bound to result in both standardization of care and disregard for the responsibility that comes with personal freedom. These two “diagnoses before the illness” can help us in defining the challenges and the potential solutions that healthcare systems face today. Understanding the fatal conceits inherent in the very architecture of national health services can be the first step toward healing our healthcare systems. (shrink)

Sociological approaches to inquiry on emotion in educational settings are growing. Despite a long tradition of research and theory in disciplines such as psychology and sociology, the methods and approaches for naturalistic investigation of emotion are in a developmental phase in educational settings. In this article, recent empirical studies on emotion in educational contexts are canvassed. The discussion focuses on the use of multiple methods within research conducted in high school and university classrooms highlighting recent methodological progress. The methods discussed (...) include facial expression analysis, verbal and nonverbal conduct, and self-report methods. Analyses drawn from different studies, informed by perspectives from microsociology, highlight the strengths and limitations of any one method. The power and limitations of multimethod approaches is discussed. (shrink)

In recent works, Chomsky has once more endorsed a computational view of rulefollowing, whereby to follow a rule is to operate certain computations on a subject’s mental representations. As is well known, this picture does not conform to what we may call the grammatical conception of rule-following outlined by Wittgenstein, whereby an elucidation of the concept of rule-following is aimed at by isolating grammatical statements regarding the phrase ‘to follow a rule’. As a result, Chomskyan and Wittgensteinian treatments of topics (...) immediately connected with rule-following, namely linguistic competence and understanding, are utterly different from one another. There are two possible stances that computationalists like Chomsky may adopt with regard to the discrepancy between the two aforementioned modes of dealing with rule-following, namely a conciliatory and a non-conciliatory attitude. According to the former attitude, grammatical remarks on and computationallyoriented theories of rule-following investigate one and the same topic although admittedly at different levels, namely a conceptual and an empirical one. According to the latter attitude, grammatical remarks are just a preliminary step in the investigation of rule-following which scientific advancement, presently represented by computationally-oriented theories on this matter, is well entitled to put aside. In what follows, however, I will try to show that both stances are problematic. The conciliatory attitude simply does not work, for it hardly copes with the fact that the concept of rule-following does not supervene, even weakly, on the property of rule-following, namely the property instantiated in the mental/cerebral phenomena that computationally-oriented theories of rule-following study. To take the contrary attitude, on the other hand, is to end up with another disappointing result, namely that the computational treatment of rule-following ultimately deals with something different from that which we wished to gain knowledge of when we began our inquiry into rule-following.. (shrink)

Da Hegel fino a Bradley, l'attacco idealista ad una concezione pluralistica della realtà come una credenza non suffragata dalla verità delle cose si è valso dell'argomento semantico secondo il quale le espressioni indicali, su cui da ultimo riposerebbe tutta la valenza referenziale del linguaggio, non si riferiscono a segmenti discreti del reale ma si limitano ad esprimere universali. Dal versante ontologico opposto, Russell ha guidato la reazione all'idealismo assoluto (inaugurando così uno dei filoni di riflessione della filosofia analitica) facendo perno (...) proprio sulla capacità da parte di tali espressioni di designare direttamente atomi distinti di realtà. L'argomento idealista, nelle sue linee generali, funziona così. Anche ammesso che un termine singolare "N" non possa denotare un'entità reale finché non è disambiguato da un completamento indicale (del tipo "questo N"), un'operazione del genere è inutile perché un'espressione indicale è a sua volta incapace di designare univocamente un individuo. Quando uso "questo", ad es., un tale uso non designa alcunché perché ogni cosa è un questo e il questo in sé stesso non è alcun individuo. Quello che faccio in tale uso è piuttosto dare luogo all'espressione di un universale, nella fattispecie del concetto (individuale) di questità. L'argomento idealista è fallace. Ma la replica russelliana, che pure ha dalla sua tutta la forza del senso comune, non è in grado di metterlo fuori gioco integralmente. Infatti, entrambi assumono - l'uno come premessa all'interno di un ragionamento ad absurdum, l'altro come tesi positiva - che riferirsi mediante un indicale ad un individuo reale corrisponde a discriminarlo da tutti gli altri individui del suo dominio. Questo significa, in altre parole, che entrambi assumono la tesi dell'indistinzione di semantica ed epistemologia. Solo una dottrina che condivida le tesi semantiche di Russell sugli indicali ma non presupponga il collassare di semantica ed epistemologia può far decadere del tutto l'argomento idealista.. (shrink)

In the course of his philosophical development, Jerry Fodor has indicated two sorts of non-broad (i.e., non-truthconditional) content of mental representations, namely content of mental state types opaquely taxonomized (de dicto content: DDC) and narrow content (NC) qua mapping function from contexts (of thought) to broad contents. According to the former conceptualization, mental state tokens which are truth-conditionally identical may be such that they cannot both truthfully ascribed to one and the same subject at the same time, for they differ (...) in their respective DDC. In Fodor's own example, Oedipus' thoughts that he will marry Jocasta and that he will marry Mum are truth-conditionally identical, but different as far their DDC is concerned; one cannot indeed truthfully ascribe both thoughts to him simultaneously1. According to the latter conceptualization instead, mental state tokens of molecularly identical twins placed in different environments (such as Earth and Twin-Earth) are such that, although they differ in their truth-conditions, they share the same NC2. For instance, these twins respectively think that water quenches thirst and that twater (a liquid similar to water but its chemical composition) quenches thirst. Although these thoughts thus differ in broad content, they have the same NC: had the Twin-Earthling twin been brought up on Earth rather than on Twin-Earth where he actually lives, he would have thought that water quenches thirst rather than that twater quenches thirst3. According to Fodor's picture, both concepts are invoked for the purpose of psychology in order to account for one and the same thing, namely subjects' behavior. On the one hand, difference in behavior of a subject whose thought-tokens have the same truth-conditions may be ascribed to difference in the DDC of these tokens4. On the other hand, identity in behavior between two molecularly identical subjects whose thought-tokens have different truth-conditions is explained in terms of the NC- identity of these tokens5.. (shrink)

Jerry Fodor now holds (1990) that the content of mental state types opaquely taxonomized (de dicto content: DDC) is determined by the 'orthographical' syntax + the computational/functional role of such states. Mental states whose tokens are both orthographically and truth-conditionally identical may be different with regard to the computational/functional role played by their respective representational cores. This make them tantamount to different contentful states, i.e. states with different DDCs, insofar as they are opaquely taxonomized. Indeed they cannot both be truthfully (...) ascribed to a single subject at the same time. Some years ago (1987), Fodor postulated a notion of mental content which also went beyond that of a mental state's truth-conditions. States whose tokens differ in their truth-conditions, or broad content, might, he claimed, still share a narrow content (NC), which was causally responsible for the shared behavior of the subjects of these states. For instance, two molecularly identical individuals, living in environments in all respects the same, except for the chemical substance of the phenomenically indistinguishable liquids filling their respective lakes and rivers, would behave similarly when having truth-conditionally different thoughts regarding those liquids. According to Fodor, this sameness of behavior was causally dependent on the sameness of the NC of the two individuals' truth-conditionally different thoughts. Now, this way of individuating mental states is still of interest for semantics. Indeed, NC allows one contextually to fix the broad content of a mental state token. Echoing Kaplan's notion of character,1 Fodor explained NC as a function that mapped contexts (of thought) onto broad contents. NC was thus invoked by Fodor mainly in order to account for sameness of intentional behavior. But DDC also plays a role in explaining intentional behavior, precisely by explaining why a subject whose thought-tokens have identical truthconditions may behave differently.. (shrink)

Che cos’hanno a che fare tra loro un filosofo che, a partire da Wittgenstein, ha sviluppato una teoria di impianto naturalista e che cerca di conciliare una prospettiva individualistica con una tendenzialmente socioesternista della competenza semantica, una teoria che studi di psicologia cognitiva e di neuroscienze si stanno incaricando di inverare, e un altro che, a partire dallo stesso Wittgenstein, ha sviluppato una concezione antinaturalista tanto dell’intenzionalità quanto della normativ...